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Introduction 
This study provides an overview of middle class politics in the Philippines in the 
context of the countlγs experience of formal democratic rule since mdependence, the 
authoritarian interregnum and the陀 sto悶tionand consolidation of democracy. 
In both academic and political circles in the Philippines, the middle classes have not 
been as systematically studied as the elites (landlords and big bus回目s)and the peasantry 
on the assumption that they constitute an msignificant segment of the population During 
the last three decades, this assertion has taken root with the lack of any sustamed 
economic growth in the country in cont悶stwith that of East Asia and the more robust 
economies in Southeast Asia. 
However, in the country’s political history, the middle classes have in fact played 
important pnlitical roles in varying co吋uncturessince the declaration of independence in 
1946 There are a number of impnrtant facto四 thataccount for the political role of the 
middle classes m the country on a scale seemingly out of proportion to their actual 
numbe目。日目t,an educated middle cla田 highlyconcent悶 tedin Metro Manila and later 
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in the m句orurban centers emerged as early as the American colonial period due to a 
combination of a number of facto四 Manila’srole as a center of the export and import 
trade in the country spawned a lot of diverse professional and technical services. In this 
context, American colonial policy introduced a system of mass public education and 
initiated the Filipinization of the civil service which opened up new opportunities for 
employment as professionals in the civil service. Thus, by the twilight of American 
colonial rule in 1939, one author estimates that those employed as professionals 
(accountants, engineers, lawyers, physicians, and college professors) teachers and 
government civil servants including those performing clerical tasks constituted 18 
pe陀entof the labor force in Manila.川
By the fifties, an education be om at the tert阻rylevel was sparked by the回markable
economic growth that took place dunng the initial penod of exchange controls and 
import substitution which saw the manufacturing sector growing at an average of 12 
percent per year This period of economic growth resulted in the proliferation of 
numerous colleges and universities providing relatively cheap tertiary education, albeit of 
very uneven quality. 
As economic growth slowed down and later stagnated in the ensuing decades, ・the 
relatively large sector of college educated individuals with middle class outlooks who 
could not日ndstable and satisfying jobs proved to be a pntent factor for the political 
activism of this segment of the middle classes. A second factor for the significant 
political pres叩 ceof the middle classes lies in the country’s legacy of a forn】alliberal 
democratic system whicl】allowedfor a far greater space in articulating and organizing 
middle class interests of various kinds Thus, the country’s history of regular electoral 
contestat旧国， freemedia and formal guarantees of civil and political rights have also 
served to develop the political skills and confidence of key fractions of the middle 
classes. It is in民間stingto note that not even the authoritarian rule of Mr. Marcos was 
able to effectively stifle the activism of civil society organizations even while many we問
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forced to go underground at the height of martial rule. A third factor that has enhanced 
the role of the middle classes in wa呂田gpolitical actions has been the development and 
growth of the new and old middle class fractions outside of the di問ctcontrol of the state. 
This has been h<Storically rooted in the development of a relatively weak state m the 
Philippines vis a-VIS powerful economic elites that initialy developed with a large degree 
of autonomy from the state. Unlike in the economies of the NICs of both East and 
Southeast Asia where the state exerted a more direct and pervasive control over 
econom<c activities, there developed in the Phtlippines a more autonomous private 
economic sector which was able to captu問 orstrongly influence various agencies of state 
power山
While the developments dIScussed above have served to condition the politics of the 
middle classes in the Philippmes, it must also be made clear that there is no distinct and 
predictable role associated with middle classes. In actual historical circumstances, middle 
class political propensities and practices can range from right-wing conservatism and 
radicalism to liberal and leflトwingpolitical causes 
Middle Class Pohtics at Varying Conjunctures smce Independence 
To understand better the major manifestations of middle class politics m the 
Philippines, three broad polittcal periods will be examined in the country’s post war 
history. The first coincid白 withthe period of formal liberal democratic politics from the 
declaration of independence in 1946 to I 972 The second covers the period of 
authoritarian rule by Marcos from 1972 to1986 And the third examines the post-Marcos 
period from I 986 to the present 
For the three periods, it is significant to note that there are common features and 
tendencies associated with middle class politics and so口albehavior First, al of the 
major opposttional political projects and movements dunng these three penods had 
middle class leaderships In turn these oppositional movements relied strongly on 
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constituencies of university students and college educated prnfessionals as their initial 
base of political support even while such projects self-consciously aimed at organizing 
other so口alclasses and secto目 fortheir ultimate political goals Second, these m吋or
organized political movements led by middle class personalities have been invariably 
mfluenced by the following ideologies・ Marxist Communist, conservative and radical 
schools of Chnstianity, syncretic ve目ionsof liberal-pluralist views, and m particular in 
the Southern Philippmes, Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. Third, there has been a 
sigm日cantrate of out migration whether as pennanent residents (mainly to the United 
States, Canada and Australia) or overseas contract workers (Middle East, Japan, 
Southeast Asia and Europe) particularly by the educated仕actionsof the middle classes. 
Middle Class Politics durmg the Period of Formal Liberal Democracy, 1946-1972 
During the postwar period underpinned by a formal liberal democratic system, 
middle class mvolvement in politics ranged from conservative to moderate and radical 
projects Among the educated progressive middle classes during this period , the most 
compelling political issue focused on fleshing out a nationalist and democratic alternative 
political program to what was then perceived as a government run by the country’s most 
powerful dynastic political clans largely subservient to American political and economic 
interests in the region. In the context of the economic downturn that overtook the 
manufacturing growth in the fifties, two major oppositional political responses emerged. 
The first was Marxist-Maoist inspi問dand gathered strength with its militant youth-
student organizations in the sixti田 andclimaxed with the launchmg of a new communist 
party in 1968. Of the 13 founding members of the new communist party, 10 came from 
middle class families and the foundmg chairman, Jose Ma. Sison, while born into a 
landed clan worked as a university professor."' Moreover, during the formative years of 
the new party the overwhelming majonty of the party’s mitial core of cadres were 
university students and intellectuals from middle class families. The guemlla movement 
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founded by the new party in 1969 also gained its momentum with cadres問cruitedfrom 
militant student and youth organizations Under the direct influence of the new party, 
several sectoral and people’s org四 1zationswere formed in the s1xt1es and seventies and 
most of these were also led by cadres with middle class backgrounds 
The second significant oppositional pohl!cal response to the crisis of the sixties and 
seventies centered on a grouping of parties and organizations directly inspired by 
Christ旧n日formismand radicalism These church-based movements also emerged as a 
direct response to what was then perceived as the developing hegemonic political threat 
posed by Marxist-mspired organizations.仰 Amongthe Catholic-based org叩 izations,the 
mflu叩 ceof the social activism of the papal encyclicals of the sixties was significant with 
much of the mitial political guidance coming from Jesuit priests and theologians One 
concerted attempt to develop a formal national political party anchored on principles of 
Christian social democracy was exemplified by the founding of the Christian Social 
Movement in the sixties and later the National Union of Christian Democrats. A mo出
radical version of Christian activism also emerged under the influence of Marxism, 
Maoism and the liberation theology of Latin America and would take organizational root 
with the foundmg of the Christians for National Liberation in the e訂lyseventies Like 
the Marxist-inspired parties and organizat旧nsthat were formed during the sixties, the 
church-based reformist and radical movements were also led四dstaffed by middle class 
professionals and college 耳目duates.
A third strand of middle class pohttcs durmg the fifles and sixties 1s seen m the 
reformist hberal activism of professionals and busme田 entrepreneurswho founded 
citizen’s parties for good government or sought to safeguard and reform the electoral 
process The best example of a middle class organization best known for its continuing 
project of monitoring electoral pro回田町 andresults is the National Movement for Free 
Elections (NAMFREL) Founded in 1951 under Amencan auspices, the organization has 
succeeded in institutionalizing itself as the country’s unofficial guardian of electoral 
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contests, particularly of the counting of votes, and has involved in the process many 
leading prof，田sionals,church and business personalities. Middle class liberal activism 
during this penod was also dramatized by the mobilization of political suppoロformany 
independent candidates during the elect10n in 1971 for members of a commission to draft 
a new constitution. 
The decade of the fifties and sixties also marked the second wave of out-migration 
of substantial number of Filipino professionals to the United States町 Mostof the 
professionals who immigrated to the United States at this time were nurses and medical 
doctors During this period, F1lipmos constituted the biggest number of nurses in the 
United States while the medical doctors were the second biggest group of migrant 
doctors, next only to those from India The pre-war and post-war wave of migrations 
have in fact made the Filipino community in the United States the fastest growing group 
of immigrants from Asia. This“brain drain”first to North Amenca and later to various 
countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe is one of the enduring proclivities of the 
educated Filipino ffi!ddle class. 
During the liberal democratic period, middle class political activism made its most 
dramatic impact with the popularization of a nationalist consciousness and political 
program articulated through both Marxist revolut10nary idioms and Christian social 
activism. Moreover, by propagating the nationalist program through the use of Pilipino, 
the national language, these political movements advanced immensely the acceptability 
of a common language of every day discourse. In light of the practice of the elites in 
using English as the official means of communication and the traditional hostility of 
other m句orethnic linguistic groupings to the use of Pi/ipino, this political popularization 
of the national language by nationalist and revolutionary organizal!ons was an important 
contribution to national consciousness and identuy. 
Fmally, reflecting their structural weakness as a political constituency, the middle-
class led political movements during this period deliberately sought and cultivated 
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systematic linkages and coalitions with other social classes and sectors, primanly those 
of the peasantry and agricultural worke四， andthe urban poor and industrial workers. 
Whether as a product of conscious ideology and strategy or a pragmatic political 
response, these politlcal and organizing efforts by the middle class-led political 
movements and parties largely defined their political credibility and organizational 
strength. 
Middle Class Politics during the Authoritarian Rule of Marcos, 1972-1986 
During the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle class poliu田 needsto be situated in 
the context of the struggle against the dicta回目hipShaped by the earlier alignment of 
political forces durmg the sixties, the organized involvement of middle class fractions 
against authoritarian rule was mediated through three basic political forces・ I) the 
Ma日istMaoist inspi肥dorgamzations under the leadership of the new Communist party 
and the much smaller independent Marxist-socialist orgamzations; 2) the Christian-
rooted political movements岨dparties with the more militant ones adopting variations of 
Chnstian social democratic ideologies, and 3) the organizations propelled by liberal 
democratic ideologies such as KAA瓦BAY(Movement for National Independence and 
Sovereignty) headed by the well-known liberal oppositionist politician, the late senator 
Jose W. Diokno. Along the same mold were organizations such as MABIN! and the Free 
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) made up of human rights lawyers opposed to the 
dictatorship. 
In the southern part of the country in Mindanao, middle class opposition to 
authoritarian rule took on a special dimension due to the special religious ethnic factor. 
Among the ethmc Muslims, middle class participation in the struggle was principally 
mediated through the originally separatist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
whose leadership also included many university educated intellectuals and students 
includmg its founding head, Nur Misuan, who once taught at the University of the 
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Philippines. 
A unique process of middle class radicalism took place during the period of 
authoritarian rule with the polrucrzal!on of the military. As an institution, the military in 
the Philippines has an officer co叩smade up overwhelmingly of recr山ts仕・ommiddle 
class famihes. By the early eighues, the prot阻ctedwar with the cnmmunist led gueπ"illas 
and the separatist Muslim armed parties in the context of the cronyrsm and lack of 
professionalism of the top loyalist Marcos generals had demoralized the younger battle一
hardened officer corps. Spearheaded by the class 1971 graduates of the Philippine 
Mi lit町yAcademy, a refoπmst faction 1dent1fied with then Secretary of National Defense 
Enrile developed within the military This would later constitute the nucleus of the 
mutinous faction that ignited the February uprising. Unlike other processes of middle 
class activism whose success usually required systematic hnkages and coalitions with 
other social class田 andsectors, the middle class military officers were in control of an 
institution that could propel them into power without any need for a social and pohtical 
base帥 Fortunatelyfor the Aquino admmistration that replaced the authoritarian rule of 
Marcos, the seven coup attempts launched by military同belsal failed. But at the same 
time, the politicrzauon of the military, like in most transitions to democratic rule, became 
the most de-stabilizing problem that the日rsttwo post Marcos admmistrations (Aquino 
and Ramos) had to addr<田s.
In terms of the composition of the middle classes, another important feature of 
authoritarian rule under M町coswas the rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy. Wuh 
Its direct intervention and control of various aspects of the economy, the Marcos 
administration c日atedseveral government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) 
In 1975, employment in GOCCs totalled 41, 250, by 1984, employment in these same 
government corporations reached 134, 453, an increase of 226 percent During the same 
penod, the entire government civil service also experienced a 145 percent mcrease from 
533, 284 in 1975 to l, 310, 789 in 1984 (Civil Service Commission 1986) Among the 
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civtl servants, public school teachers at varying levels proved to be the most re'ponsive 
to the anti-dictatorshtp struggle and a number of both aboveground and clandestine 
mihtant organizations emerged from their ranks 
In I 983, the assassmation of oppositionist senator Benigno Aquino Jr who was 
retummg仕ompolittcal exile in the United States provided a decisive turning point旧the
struggle against authoritarian rule Aquino’s murder took place m the context of an 
intensifying economic crisis and more than a decade-long struggle agamst the 
dictatorship by communist-led armed guemllas in the countrystde and several legal and 
clandestine organizattons in m句orcities and town centers al over the country The 
assassination of the well-known opposition leader further f悶cturedthe remaining elite 
support for the dictatorship and opened up new opportunities for coalitional politics 
among various parties and or且anizationsof different pohtical persuast0ns. With the 
emergence of a far broader and more determined oppositi旧民 manysectors traditionally 
cowed by the dictatorship were emboldened to join open actions of defiance agamst 
authoritanan rule Thus, during the twihght ye町・sof the authoritarian regime some of the 
most vivid open protests erupted in the very centers of high commerce and finance 
involving the professionals, white collar workers, and the anti crony business 
pe四onalities."1
Through four days of m1htary mutiny and a people’s uprismg from 22-25 February 
1986, the struggle against the dictato目hipclimaxed with Mr. Marcos fleeing to Hawaii 
under American auspices.刷 Ithas become fashionable to refer to the four days of mutmy 
阻 duprising in February 1986 as the“middle class田volution”thatsignalled the end of 
the d1ctatorsh1p It 1s of course true that many of those who played leadership role' 
during the uprising, particularly in the EDSA刷 partof the confrontation, were 
professionals and middle class personalities mcludmg the mutinous military o節目白血d
the ubiquitous priests and nuns It 1s also true, however, that in other a問asof the popular 
uprismg, m paロicularthe Mendiola area in the vicimty of the presidential palace, le白一
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wmg organized labor organizations had a pronounced political presence. What needs to 
be explained more carefully is the genuinely popular nature of the uprising that 
galvanized the p町tic1pationof the people from al walks of hfe, rich and poor ahke.0°1 
In the struggle against the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle class leade日hipwas 
pervasive among al opposition groups across ideological and political lines with the 
exception of the political parties led by anti・Marcospoliticians from conservative, long 
established political and economic clans. It was difficult, however, to construct stable 
coalitional linkages among various groups of competing ideological outlooks and 
political strategies For mstance, the assassination of Aquino provided excellent 
opportunities for coali!Ional politics agamst the dictatorship. In another sense, however, 
by pushing the Marcos admmistration into a politically defensive stance, this same event 
opened up the democra!Ic space that allowed smaller, less ideological opposition groups 
to be le" dependent organizationally on the much bigger pohtical formations On the 
whole, the struggle agamst the Marcos dictatorship showcased the political strengths阻d
we出ness田 ofthe middle class田 intheir political p悶cticesas class fractions. As a source 
of political leadership, the middle classes, especially its most educated segment, have 
indeed responded to al kmds of political projects, whether as technocrats of the Marcos 
dictatorship, cadres of revolutionary parties, or army coup leaders But it is this same 
flexibility and contrad1ctormess which stress the limitations of the middle class as a 
constituency for political action 
Middle Class Politics during the Post-Marcos Period since 1986 
With the問storationof formal democratic rule following the popular ratification of 
a new constitution and the holding of elections in 1987, the electoral system once again 
became the main arena for legitimizing political contestations in the country.I'" The 
transition to democratic rule, however, has been extremely contentious and protracted 
Reflecting the problem of a politicized milit訂y,the Aquino-led successor admmistration 
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to authoritarian rule had to weather no less than seven coup attempts in its first four years 
in office It took the next admmistrauon under former General Ramos, elected as 
president in 1992, to successfully conclude a po!tt1cal settlement with the military rebels 
in 1995四da peace accord with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 
Following the Ramos administration, the Estrada presidency elected in 1998 has yet to 
work out a political solution vis-a-vis the local communist led challenge, now more than 
thi町fyears in armed oppos山on Moreover, the government contmues to face another 
armed challenge from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway armed 
party from the MNLF, and the Abu Sayyaf, a small separatist Muslim armed group but 
mo回 proneto non-conventional forms of armed engagement including the takmg of 
civi!tan hostages. 
For many middle classーledorganizations and middle class personalities, the openmg 
up of democratic space and the restoration of electoral contests in the post-Marcos period 
signalled a serious reexamination of strategies and tactics for political practice and 
contestation Many have opted to explo肥 theopportunities and possibi!It1es provided by 
the democ同tizedconjuncture, in spite of al its faults and weaknesses. The pa回ageof the 
Local Government Code in 1991 further provided incentives for NGOs and smaller, new 
political p副 iesto contest political power at the local levels of government. With the 
revival of the electoral process, much of the more moderate strand of middle class 
activism centered on the revival and strengthening of NAMFREL as the electoral 
watchdog paロtcularlyduring national elections. 
In taking advantage of these new arenas of organizing and mobilizmg, many 
developmental NGOs and people’s or呂田izations(POs) have formed political netw01i<s 
to support progressive candidates or work out coalit10ns with the existing pohtical 
pa巾es.More問cently,these networks have formed new polittcal parties m問sponseto 
the party !tst system, resultmg in the first set of elected party list candidates in the lower 
house of Congress in the 1998 nat10nal elect10ns Another tendency has been reflected in 
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simply maximizing the political and organizational田achof developmental and advocacy 
NGOs and people’s organizations but uncoupling this effort from any armed politrcal 
movement. A good example of this is the political activism that has animated the 
Philippme Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), the country’s biggest single 
developmental NGO"" 
These new possibilities for political action and strategy sparked by the transition to a 
mo肥 openpolity highlights the most crucial aspect of policy debates across al political 
and ideological spectrums: does the newly opened up political space provide enough 
opportunities to pursue fundamentally transformatrve socio-political projects without 
resorting to armed struggle? In its various manifestations, this contested claim has been 
one of the reasons for the internal debates that have bedeviled the armed communist 
movement in the country since 1986, leading to serious organizational splits."" In 
response to the restoration of formal democratic rule, al of the oppositional formatmns 
and p町ti田 influencedby Christian social activism have embraced the electoral system as 
the legitimate arena for political contestatmn. Following the successful peace 
negotiations concluded with the government in 1995, the once clandestme military rebel 
formations have also come out m the open With the active p町ticipationof personalities 
WI由 militarybackgrounds in electoral contests, a new generation of soldier-politicians 
has emerged in fact. 
One impor阻ntarea for further understanding middle class behavior lies m their 
part1c1pation in the phenomenon of contract labor overseas. In the search for better work 
opportunities abroad, Fflipinos have served as overseas contract workers m significant 
numbers. One study shows that“the number of processed Filipmo contract workers 
increased twenty-fold over a 16-year penod，丘omjust over 36,000 m 1975 to almost 
700,000 in 1991”（C町ifio1992:6). During a 12 year penod from 1895 to 1996, statistics 
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency show that an average of 600,000 
Filipinos left由ecountry as overseas co回目ctworkers From 1986 to 1994, the average 
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dollar remittances of these overseas workers constituted 17 percent of the country’s 
annual eκports！同
The extent of mtddle class participation in the overseas Filtpino workers (OFW) 
phenomenon ts indicated by data on their educational backgrounds Using data from the 
1995 Census of Population, one author calculates由atof those with at le田tsome college 
background, 22 percent had served as OFW. The same data show that of those with at 
least a college degree, 16 percent had been OFWs (Jackson 1997 44) One other study 
completed in 1983 also reveals that over 50 percent of the Filipino migrant workers 
surveyed had completed college, or had at least taken some college subjects (Gibson 
1983)."" An important aspect of血eOFW eλperience血atneeds to be systematically 
studied lies m the way th!S process has reconstituted identities and transformed the social, 
economic, and political positions of the workers and their familtes '"' For its political 
implications, it may be argued that the OFW phenomenon has provided a safety valve 
that underCl』tsthe social basis for political acttvism and milttancy On the other hand, it 
may have also produced a new gen町ationof commumty leaders with political skils and 
more diverse resources and more receptive to progressive polttical projects and less 
tolerant of the traditional ways of doing thmgs. 
Another significant ar凹aof middle class politics li回目白esupport for chansmatic 
religious movements, in both their Catholic and Protestant vanants. While not new m the 
country’s cultural and religmus tradition, these charismatic movements took on a special 
fervor starting in the mid eighti田 withthe founding of El Shaddai, the biggest Catholic 
chansmatic movement claiming a card-carrying membe四hipof half a million."" Among 
the Protestant groups, the most influential are the Jesus is Lord Fellowship and Jesus 
Miracle Crusade. Spawned during periods of economic and political 印刷s,these 
movements have thnved due to thetr ability to address some popul町 needor longmg, 
白血erignored or unattended to by established mstituttons including the government 
An important mdicator of middle class support for出国ereligious movements can be 
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inferred from the socio economic profile of the regular listeners of radio station DWXI 
which regularly a1四 theEl Shadda1 programs During the Monday to Friday airings of El 
Shaddai's programs, one survey reveals that 40 percent of the regular listeners belong to 
Class C which is the equivalent of the middle classes in the classification scheme used by 
consumer肥searchorganizations in the countrγυ匂Showmgorganizing and mobihzmg 
skils and the sophisticated use of mass media, these回ligiousmovements have started to 
showcase their ability to influence political contests For instance, during the last 
presidential elections in 1997, the El Shaddai through their leader Brother Mariano 
“Mike”Velarde, endorsed Estrada, the presidential winner, while the other movements 
supported other candidates. 
With the restoration of elite democratic rule m the post-Marcos years, much of 
middle class activism has veered toward open, legal and electoral means of struggle The 
political opening, however, has taken place inthe context of continuing economic 
malaise and the government’s inability to negotiate a political settlement with two 
protracted armed challenges: the communist-led gue汀iliamovement and the separatist 
Muslim movement in the south. Since the penod of independence, middle class 
leadership of various kinds of political orgamzations, movements and parties have been 
pervasive and significant. A more open political arena is no doubt congenial to the 
exercise of political leadership over various kinds of org叩 izationsby middle class 
fractions, especially of Its most educated sectors. But the working out of successful 
coalitional political a町angementsbetween the middle classes and other classes and 
sectors to achieve long term soc10-political ends is a more difficult process. 
As shown in past histoncal co町unctu問s,middle class fractions can provide the 
leadership for almost al kinds of political projects. They are politically important not 
because of their numbe四 orcohesiveness, certamly absent in the Ph11ippme context, but 
because of their possession of technical competencies and political-organizatmnal skils, 
highly prized by both the elites and oppositional movements of the disadvantaged 
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classes. Organically Jinked to any group or movement, these competencies and skils can 
have an impact far beyond the physical numbers of ts middle-class partrsans and 
practitioners. 
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and the involvement of military and civilian officials and private persons in this 
failed project. Kudeta: The Cha/le11ge to Philippine Democracy (Manila・ Philippine 
Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990); and 民lipeB. Miranda，“The Miiitary: 
At the Crossroads of Politicization，＇’Duet for EDSA 1996: Lookmg Back, Looking 
F01 wa1d, edited by Loma Kalaw Tirol (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People 
Power, Inc., 1995), pp 63-87. 
(7) See for instance, Ma. Cynthia Banz。nBautista, 
Collar Worl《ersof Makati after the Aqr』i】oAssassination，”U p DσFαrtment of 
Sociology Paper’Series N。l’1985
(8) For a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fal of the Marcos dictatorship, see 
Aurora Javate De Dios, Petromlo Bn Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw Tirol, eds, 
Dictatorship and Revolutio11. Roots of People’s Powe1 (Metro Manila: Conspectus 
Foundat10n, Inc , 1988). 
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(9) EDSA sl四 dsfor the initials of the highway named a白erEp1f;皿 iode los Santos, a 
historian of the Phihppn】erevolution agamst Spain. The m勾orpaロofthe people’s 
uprising in February 1986 converged at a portion of EDSA which runs between the 
two major military camps where the rebelhous factions of the militaηlaunched 
their mutiny against Marcos 
(IO) Seeking a more cultu目lynuanced explanation for the part1c1pation of workers and 
the urban poor m the popular upnsing, Michael Pinches deploys the notion of 
communitas This captures the extraordinary sense of camaraderie generated by the 
event while explaining the management of shame in its contradictory aspects of 
r°'istance and accommodation to the established order. See his“The Working Class 
Experience of Shame, Inequality, and People Power in Tatalon, Manila，＇’ From 
Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives 01 Political Transition in the Philippines, 
edited by Benedict J Kerkvliet and Resil B. M句ares(Ateneo de Manila University 
Press, 1991), pp. 166-186. 
(11) For an assessment of developments ten years after the formal restoration of 
democratic rule in !986, see Lorna Kalaw T1rol, ed., Duet/01 EDSA 1996: Looking 
Back, Looking Forward (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc., 
1995). 
(12) Various aspects of the activities of NGOs, and peoples organizations and their 
出lationswith the state are analyzed in: Marlon A Wui and Ma Glenda S Lopez, 
eds., State Civil Society Relations in Policy Making (Quezon City. The Third World 
Studies Center, 1997); and Minam Coronel Ferrer, ed., Civil Society Makmg Civil 
Society (Quezon City. The Thlfd World Studies Center, 1997). 
(13) For a discussion of the problems that have beset the communist-led armed 
間volutionarymovement in the country smce 1986, see Joel Rocamora, Breaking 
Through: The Snuggle Within the Communist Pai ty of the Philippines (Metro 
Manila. Anvil Publishing, Inc, 1994); and Patnc10 N Abmales, ed., The Revolution 
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Falters.・TheLeft in Philippine Palitics Aftei 1986 (Ithaca, New York・ Cornell 
University Southeast Asia Program Publicat1ons, 1996). 
(14) calculated from the Philippine Statistical Yem book, 1995 and the POEA 
Employment info Series I (I) 1993 
(15) Katherine D Gibson，“Contract Labour Migration from the Philippines: Preliminary 
Fieldwork Report”（Department of Human Geog田phy,Research School of Pacific 
Studies, Australian National Universily), cited in Benjamin B Cari目o，‘＇Migrant
Workers from the Philippines，＇’Philippine Labor Migration. impact and Policy, 
edited by Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (Quezon City: Scalabrini 
Migration Center, 1992). 
(16) Some studies that address the various aspects of this phenomenon include. Anne 
Marie Hilsdon, 
Overseas Workers in the Philippin回， Pilipinas,No. 29 (Fall 1997), pp 49 62’R 
Pertierra’ed., Roninα1ce1 a11d Retumees: The Cnltura/ Economy q川1igrationi1 
Jlocos (Quezon City. New Day Publishers, 1992); and Noel D. Vasquez，“Economic 
and Social Impact of Labor Migration，＇’P/11/ippine Lab01 Migration: Impact and 
Policy, edited by Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (Quezon City: 
Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992), pp. 4ト67.
(17) For a study of El Shaddai, see Grace R. Gorospe-Jamon，“The El Shadda1 Prayer 
Movement. A Study of Political Socializauon in a Religious Context" (Ph.D. 
dissertat旧民theUniversity of the Ph1hppmes, 1999). 
(18) Survey findings by the Asia Research Orgamzation and cited in Grace Gorospe 
Jamon，“The El Shadda1 Prayer Movement: A Study of Political Sociahzauon in a 
Religious Context”This same survey shows that 56 percent of the regular listeners 
of the radio station belong to Class DE, the equivalent of the low-income and poor 
social classes 
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この研究は、 I)1946～1972年のリベラルデモクラシーの期間、 2)1972～1986 
年のマルコスによる権威主義的支配、 3)1986年の民主的統治の回復から現在ま
で、という三つの時代における中間階級の政治的役割を考察する。
これら三つの時代に対して、本研究は中間階級の政治と社会行動に関連する
三つの共通する特徴及び傾向を特定する。第一に、これら三つの時代を通じて、
全ての主要な反体制的政治プロジェクト及び運動は中間階級に指導されていた。
第二に、中間階級出身の人物によって指導されたこれらの王要な組織的政治運
動は明らかに次のようなイデオロギーによって影響を受けてきた。すなわち、
マルクス主義的共産主義、キリスト教の保守的及び急進的諸派、自由主義的多
元主義の諸見解の混合版、及ぴ、特にフィリピン南部において、イスラム教原
理主義と急進主義である。第三に、定住者として（主にアメリカ合衆国、カナ
ダ、オーストラリアへの）であれ、或いは海外契約労働者（中東、日本、東南
アジア及び西ヨーロツノて）としてであれ、かなりの人口流出があり、とくにそ
れは中間階級の教育を受けた層であった。
権威主義的支配の時代には、軍部の政治化とともに、中間階級の急進主義と
22 
いう独特な経過を見た。軍部の政治化された諸派閥はアキノ政権に対して多く
のクーデタを指導し、失敗に終わった。
全体として、様々な政治プロジェクト及び政治運動において、中間階級の政
治的リーダーシップが大きな勢力を持っていることが明らかになった。それは、
中間階級が持っている政治組織力と技術的能力のためである。これらの政治組
織力と技能的能力はエリートや不利な条件におかれた階級・地域の反体制的運
動から高く評価されている。
